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Social Image Concerns and Pro-Social Behavior
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Using longitudinal data on the entire population of blood donors in an Italian town, we 
examine how donors respond to an award scheme which rewards them with “medals” when 
they reach certain donation quotas. Our results indicate that donors significantly increase the 
frequency of their donations immediately before reaching the thresholds for which the 
rewards are given, but only if the prizes are publicly announced in the local newspaper and 
awarded in a public ceremony. The results are robust to several specifications, sample 
definitions, and controls for observable and unobservable heterogeneity. Our findings are 
consistent with social image concerns being a primary motivator of pro-social behavior, and 
indicate that symbolic prizes are most effective as motivators when they are awarded 
publicly. Because we do not detect a reduction in donation frequency after the quotas are 
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Motivating individual contributions to public goods and the performance of pro-social activities
is a topic of increasing interest in Economics. These activities represent a substantial part
of social life, as they include such actions as donating money for a cause or an organization,
volunteering for a party during election times, cleaning beaches, or donating blood. In the
US, for example, it is estimated that the dollar value of volunteer time is over $240 billion
(Independent Sector 2006). Yet, for many of these activities, the supply is still below societal
needs. Blood donations represent a prominent example of the diﬀusion of altruistic activities on
the one hand, and on the insuﬃciency of the supply on the other.1 Situations of shortage are
the rule rather than the exception in most western countries, and even more so in developing
nations.2 This chronic supply shortage is worrisome for blood transfusions can be life-saving in
some critical situations, such as massive blood loss due to trauma, blood replacement during
surgical interventions, and to treat several chronic diseases, and there is no substitute available
for human blood. In addition, surgical innovations such as organ transplants and the aging of
the population are signiﬁcantly shifting up demand. Neither eligibility criteria, nor a lack of
information seem to explain why this supply shortage is occurring, since, for example, only 1/8th
of eligible Americans (40% of the population) donate each year, and information campaigns, as
well as communications about shortage periods (for example, during the summer season and
around the holidays), are conducted with high frequency. This holds for many other pro-social
activities as well.
An alternative cause left to be explored to understand what would lead people to increase
the performance of pro-social activities concerns people’s behaviors and incentives. Individuals
might simply ﬁnd it not worthwhile to dedicate time to pro-social activities if the beneﬁts fall
short of the opportunity costs. Or, just as documented for other domains, such as physical
exercise or smoking cessation (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006, Ashraf, Karlan and Yin 2006),
potential donors may lack ability to commit. If these causes are relevant, then explicit incentives
m i g h tb ee ﬀective in increasing the number and frequency of donation by the eligible population.
A number of studies have investigated the impact of providing explicit incentives with eco-
1The Web site BloodBook.com reports that more than 16 million units of blood are annually collected in the
United States. The Italian Association of Blood Donors (Associazione Volontari Italiani del Sangue: AVIS) has
collected about 2 million units of blood in 2006 (AVIS 2007), and forty-four percent French declare to have donated
blood at least once (Healy 2006).
2In the US, the American Red Cross and other organizations collecting blood need to have, at each point in
time, the blood necessary for three days of demand at each location and for each blood type, but this target
is seldom met, especially for rare blood types (including 0 negative, which is the universal donor and therefore
particularly precious). Moreover, it is estimated that worldwide, there is currently a shortage of about 22 million
units of blood (HemoBiotech 2008).
2nomic value on the contribution to public goods. On the one hand, a few ﬁndings indicate a
positive impact of material incentives. For example, Goette and Stutzer (2008) ﬁnd that blood
donors are attracted by the possibility to participate in a lottery at a drive. They ﬁnd, however,
also some evidence of "adverse selection" in the quality of blood. Lacetera and Macis (2008) ﬁnd
that the legislative provision that guarantees a paid day oﬀ work to Italian blood donors does
lead to an increase in donation frequency. This raises the question, however, whether the increase
in frequency more than compensates the cost for the Government to reimburse employers for
the missed hours by donors-employees. Meer and Rosen (2008) show that selﬁsh considerations
can emerge also when explicit incentives are not present, since alumni at a research university
increase their donations as their children approach college age and are positively aﬀected by
whether their children actually apply to that same university.
On the other hand, several empirical studies as well as theories have pointed out that mater-
ial incentives can backﬁre. Edward Deci and his collaborators found that adding explicit rewards
for the performance of activities which are originally motivated by intrinsic reasons leads to a
reduction in the performance of those activities (Deci 1975). More recently, similar ﬁndings have
been obtained by, among others, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) and Gneezy and Rustichini
(2000). Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008), ﬁnally, ﬁnd that Swedish female college students are
less willing to undertake a health test in order to be able to donate blood afterward, if they are
oﬀered monetary incentives. The authors interpret their results as consistent with the claims
of Titmuss (1971), although no crowding-out was detected among males. Benabou and Tirole
(2006) have formalized these eﬀects in a model where individuals perform altruistic activities to
increase their social reputation and self-respect. The introduction of economic rewards creates
doubts about the true reason behind pro-social behavior, thus potentially crowding out intrinsic
motives. These claims are consistent with diﬀused opinions among several charitable organiza-
tions as well as legislators. Organizations such as the Red Cross prohibit paying donors in cash
or even pre-paid cards, while small in-kind and symbolic rewards can be oﬀered to donors. The
performance of many activities is voluntary and unpaid by law in certain instances, as in the case
of blood donation in most Western countries. The voluntary nature is expected to discourage
low-quality contributors who would be attracted only by the extrinsic reward, and to not crowd
out the intrinsic motives to contribute.
Other scholars, however, have advanced the idea that other forms of explicit incentives, such
as symbolic awards, can increase the motivations to perform pro-social activities without the
drawbacks from more material forms of payment. For example Frey and Neckermann (2008)
claim that, unlike explicit payments, symbolic awards may be less costly, create a special rela-
3tionship between the awarding and awarded parties, and increase the self-esteem, social status,
and social recognition of the receiver, while monetary rewards can instead send a "bad signal"
(to society and to one’s own self) about the real motives behind the performance of a given
activity. If this is true, then symbolic awards can emerge as both eﬀective and eﬃcient means
to encourage pro-social behavior.
In this paper, we assess the impact of symbolic awards on the performance of pro-social
activities, and investigate what characteristics of these awards appear to inﬂuence behavior the
most. Speciﬁcally, we ask the question: Are symbolic rewards attractive per se,o ri si tt h es o c i a l
prestige attached to receiving an award that matters? To answer this question, we analyze the
eﬀects of a symbolic award scheme put in place by the Italian Association of Voluntary Blood
Donors (AVIS). The Association gives symbolic awards (medals) when a donor reaches certain
donation quotas. One crucial feature of this scheme is that some of the prizes are assigned
privately, while others are awarded in a public ceremony, and the names of the recipients are
published in the Association’s Bulletin and in the local newspaper. This peculiar feature of
AVIS’ award scheme gives us a unique opportunity to understand what characteristics of the
awards actually aﬀect donors’ behavior, thereby shedding light on the actual motivations behind
blood donation, and altruistic behavior in general. If donors respond to the presence of an award,
and the response is due to such motives as the attachment to the Association as represented by
the medal, self-esteem, or, say, by a "competitive drive" to receive the award, then we should
not observe any diﬀerence in the response to private and publicly assigned awards. If instead,
donors are attracted by the increase in social prestige deriving from reaching a certain donation
quota, then donors should respond positively only to the public awards.
Our study is based on a unique, hand-collected, longitudinal dataset comprising the whole
individual histories of blood donations of the entire population of donors in an Italian mid-
sized town (The Town hereinafter) between 2002 and 2006.3 The analysis shows that blood
donors react to the symbolic award incentives by increasing their donation frequency, as the
donation thresholds to receive one of the awards approach. The change in behavior, however, is
substantial in magnitude and statistically signiﬁcant (across multiple econometric speciﬁcations)
only in proximity of those awards which are publicly given. The reduction in the lag between
two donations when the "public award" approaches is as high as about 30% just before the
threshold is reached, and is not followed by an ebb in donation frequency once the threshold is
reached. The social prestige attached to being a repeat donor could, therefore, function as an
eﬀective incentive to increase the supply of blood.
3To protect the privacy of the donors in our database, we have agreed to keep the name of The Town (as well
as any other identifying information) conﬁdential.
4The ﬁndings in this paper are consistent with a number of economic theories and some
anecdotal evidence on the role of social prestige concerns for the performance of pro-social
activities and the provision of public goods (Harbaugh [1998a, 1998b], Benabou and Tirole 2006,
and Polborn 2007), as well as with claims advanced by scholars in other disciplines (Goode 1978,
Wedekind 1998, Nowak and Sigmund 2000, Price 2003). Systematic empirical evidence on the
impact of social image concerns is scant, however. Notable exceptions are represented by a
few recent experimental studies. Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2008) ﬁnd that their experimental
subjects would type faster on a keyboard, when the typing speed is associated to donation to
"good causes" and the subjects’ performance is publicized. Similar results are obtained when
subjects are asked to cycle on a stationary bike. Neckermann and Frey (2007), in an experiment
within a corporate setting, ﬁnd that awards given to workers who contribute to a public good
are more eﬀective — in terms of the expressed intention of the subjects to contribute to the public
good — when the awardees are made public.
In addition to oﬀering evidence from a novel and unique data source, our analysis comple-
ments and adds to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, we analyze a naturally
occurring reward system, and we study its impact on the actual behavior of donors, thus address-
ing the concerns expressed by a few scholars on the external validity of laboratory experiments.
In particular, Levitt and List (2007) suggest that subjects might exhibit stronger moralistic and
pro-social behavior in laboratory settings, where they might feel that their behavior is being
highly scrutinized (see also List 2006 and Lazear, Malmendier and Weber 2006). To the best of
our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst to present econometric work on an actual award scheme in
the context of blood donation and of pro-social activities more generally. Second, we base our
study on the whole population of blood donors of a given town, therefore we rely on a larger
and more representative sample.4 Third, the longitudinal nature of our data allows observing
the same individuals multiple times, thus allowing us to control for observed and unobservable
individual heterogeneity.
By quantifying the impact of social image concerns on the performance of an activity with
major health and societal implications, this study also provides insights to charitable organi-
zations and to policymakers. Charitable organizations might learn about the aspects of their
rewards that are more eﬀective in attracting donors, and in particular the publicity of these
4Most experimental studies use college students as subjects of laboratory and ﬁeld experiments, and relatively
gender-balanced samples. At least for the case of blood donations, individuals under the age of 25 represent
only a small portion of the population of donors, and not necessarily a representative one, and women are only
one-quarter of the population of donors. In the data used in this paper, for example, the average donor is 37 years
old, donors younger than 25 are less than 10 percent of the sample, and only about 20 percent of new donors
are younger than 25. The average donor is about 40 years old in the United States and most other European
countries.
5rewards since it boosts an individual’s social image. Policymakers will learn about the eﬀects
of public subsidies to organizations providing public goods and pro-social activities, on the in-
centives by private individuals to contribute as well. A vast literature has investigated whether
private contribution would be crowded out by public subsidies (Andreoni [1990, 1993], Andreoni,
Harbaugh and Vesterlund 2007). If a major motive for pro-social behavior is social prestige, then
public interventions should not crowd out, and would instead add to private contributions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional
context of this study, and the particular award scheme of interest. Section 3 describes the data
and outlines our hypotheses and empirical strategy. The empirical ﬁndings are reported in
Section 4, and Section 5 oﬀers a discussion and concluding remarks. All tables and ﬁgures are
gathered in the Appendixes.
2 Blood Donation in Italy and in The Town
The data in this study originate from hand-collected information on the whole blood donation
histories of all donors in an Italian town ("The Town" hereinafter) located in the Center-North
of the country from 2002 to 2006. The demographic, social, and economic characteristics of The
Town’s population are highly representative of the overall Italian urban population.5 Before
describing the data in detail, we report on the blood donation system in Italy and in The Town.
B l o o dd o n a t i o ni nI t a l yi so r g a n i z e dt h r o u g hb l o o db a n k s ,w h i c ha r er u nb yv o l u n t a r yd o n o r
associations. These associations have a central headquarter as well as local units. In order to
donate blood, an individual is required to become a member of one of these associations. The
three major associations, which are present in diﬀerent parts of the country and do not compete
with one another, are Associazione Volontari Italiani del Sangue (AVIS), with about 1.1 million
members in 2007, Federazione Italiana delle Associazioni Donatori di Sangue (FIDAS), with
about 400,000 members (Caligaris 2007), and Fratres (150,000 members in 2000).6 Since the
aﬃliation is to a local unit of the national associations, blood donors predominantly donate in
the town where "their" unit is located. In The Town, blood donation is managed by the local
unit of the largest blood donor association, AVIS, and aphereses of either whole blood or blood’s
5Statistics comparing the Town with other Italian towns under a number of socio-economic characteristics are
available upon request.
6Blood donations run through blood banks and voluntary donor associations (which were present since the
1920s) have become the oﬃcial blood donation and collection system in Italy, after a brief period, following the
end of World War II, when the Red Cross played a prominent role. Similar blood bank systems exist in other
countries, such as Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, and Spain. In the UK, France, and Ireland, by contrast, the
organization of blood donation is run by the State. The Red Cross, ﬁnally, is the dominant organization managing
blood donation in such countries as Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, and the US. In the US, however, the
system is more heterogeneous and competitive, comprising the Red Cross, blood banks, and hospitals directly
managing blood donations. See Healy (2006) on the diﬀerent organizational modes of blood donations.
6components (plasma, platelets) are performed at The Town’s public hospital, Monday through
Saturdays from 8 to 11 a.m.
The Italian law sets limits to the frequency of donations of blood and blood products. Whole
blood can be collected once every 90 days from male donors and once every 180 days from females
(the diﬀerential treatment of females was introduced only in 1990). Donors can give platelets
once every 30 days and plasma once every 14 days. Donations of blood components have shorter
recovery time (at the hospital and between donations), but take longer to be performed. The
time required for a platelet or plasma donation is about one hour, against an average of twenty
minutes for a whole blood donation. Including the time to reach the donation site, the waiting
time before the donation and the resting time at the hospital after the donation (which is higher
for whole blood donation), on average a donor should expect a commitment of about two hours.
2.1 Rewarding and Recognizing Donors though Symbolic Awards
AVIS has established a series of symbolic awards for frequent donors, as a way to express
gratitude for their activity, and, presumably, to motivate all donors to continue donating in a
regular fashion. When a donor reaches certain thresholds in terms of number of donations, (s)he
is awarded with such prizes as diplomas, medals, and pins. The thresholds to receive the various
awards are ﬁxed at 8, 16, 24, 50, 75 and 100 donations since joining the Association. Donations of
whole blood, plasma or other blood products all count equally toward the awards. Furthermore,
while the recipients of the awards associated with the 8th, 16th, 24th are notiﬁed and awarded
"privately" (they pick up their medals at the Association’s local oﬃce), when a donor reaches
the 50th, 75th and 100th donation (s)he is rewarded in a public ceremony held once every two
years, and his/her name is published in the local newspapers and in the Association’s bulletin.
Table 1 presents the awards, the accumulated donations required to win them, and the fraction
of donations corresponding to awards in the years 2002 to 2006.
[Table 1 about here]
Figure 1 shows an article from a local newspaper, reporting on the latest award ceremony,
and Figure 2 displays an actual AVIS membership card. The AVIS membership card reports the
date and type of each donation made by the donor, which allows donors (and the Association)
to verify whether the required interval between donations has been met, and to keep precise
track of the cumulative number of donations made to date.
[Figure 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
73 Data, Hypotheses, and Empirical Strategy
Using both AVIS’ and the hospital’s archives, we identiﬁed all of the Association’s members
from 2002 to 2006, for whom we obtained the entire donation history (of whole blood or blood
components) over this period and the total number of past donations (as of 12/31/2001). We
were able to record a number of individual variables over time. Information includes sex, age,
blood type, and the date when each individual became an AVIS member and therefore began
to donate blood. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the donors. Over the ﬁve-year
period covered by our data, 2,009 unique individuals have donated blood in The Town, about 30
percent of whom were females. Over 14 thousand donations were made in the period 2002-06.
The median donor is 37 years old and made 6 donations in the sample period. Of the donors
who were already active as of 12/31/2001, half had been members of the Association for at least
7 years and made at least 14 donations before 2002.
[Table 2 about here]
Our data allow us to sort the donations of each individual and to compute the elapsed time
(in days) between consecutive donations, which will be our key dependent variable. If donors
care about receiving symbolic awards, we might observe them speeding up their donations, as
the thresholds for receiving these awards approach. If, in particular, donors care about their
social image associated to reaching a quota, then we would observe donors speeding up as the
thresholds granting public awards are approached. The speeding might be concentrated right
before a threshold is reached, if donors become aware of approaching the threshold as they get
close to it. Since the time between two donations is, by law, relatively long, it is implausible to
assume that donors have a "full donation plan" ex ante, thus progressively reducing the elapsed
time between donations over a large number of donations. In addition, donors might develop a
habit, such that if they speed up as the threshold approaches, they might keep a lower interval
between donations after the threshold is reached. Conversely, instead of developing a habit
donors might return to their average spells once a threshold is reached, or even slow down their
donation frequency especially when the distance between consecutive thresholds increases.
The analysis below tests the hypotheses just stated. The characteristics of the data, and in
particular the richness of observable characteristics for which we can control and the longitudinal
nature that allows us to observe the same donor multiple times, play a key role in our eﬀort to
identify the impact of awards in general and social image concerns in particular. A ﬁnding that
donors speed up as they approach a reward threshold may not imply a causal impact of social
image concerns on donation behavior, unless a number of factors potentially correlated with
8donation frequency are accounted for. These factors might include sex, age, the number of past
donations, as well as the type of donations an individual does — whole blood, plasma, or platelets
— since the required minimum amount of time between the previous donation and the current
one varies with the type of the current donation.7 Perhaps more fundamentally, individuals
might diﬀer in their unobservable donation attitudes. For example, donors with many donations
might have a long "donor tenure" just because they let shorter time pass between donations;
if we observe a reduction in the elapsed time between donations when donors are closer to the
public award thresholds, this might just be the case because the donors who actually reach a
higher number of donations are those who donate more frequently, regardless of the presence of
awards, and for reasons unrelated to social recognition, such as their sheer generosity. In the
analysis that follows, we do control for observable characteristics of donors, and also exploit the
longitudinal nature of our individual donation data to control for donor ﬁxed eﬀects.
Note, ﬁnally, that the incentive scheme of our interest resembles multi-period, non-linear
incentive plans sometimes observed in employment relationships and in education, where pay-
ments or high grades are obtained when certain quotas are reached or are restricted to a small
number of participants (Asch 1990, Oyer 1998, Oettinger 2002). In the context of charitable
giving, Meer and Rosen (2008) study the contribution of alumni to their university, and the
eﬀect of an "implicit" multi-period, non-linear incentive as represented by the approaching of
the college age by the alumni’s children and whether they have applied to that same university.
All these studies assess changes in behavior as the thresholds to enjoy a particular reward or
bonus approaches, and we follow a similar strategy in our attempt to identify the presence of
social image concerns.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Awards’ Visibility and Donation Lags: Descriptive Evidence
Table 3 reports information on the elapsed time between consecutive donations. Overall, the
average and median intervals are 158 and 119 days, respectively. As noted above, donors are
required by the law to wait at least 90 days (for males, 180 for females) between two whole blood
donations, 30 days for platelets and 14 days for plasma. The second panel of Table 3 reports
statistics for male donors only, and the third panel shows information about male donors who
7Conversations with doctors and AVIS oﬃcials in The Town revealed that the type of donation is "exogenous"
to a donor’s choice. Donors, in general, join the Association to donate whole blood, and are assigned to donating
blood components if they are not eligible to donate whole blood (e.g., if they have insuﬃcient iron in their blood),
or if there is some urgent need for a blood component. As a consequence, it is highly implausible that donors
shift types of donations toward more "frequent ones" (e.g., shift from whole blood to platelets) as the awards
thresholds approach.
9always donate whole blood. For donations of whole blood by male donors, the average and
median intervals are equal to 190 and 141 days, respectively. Both in the whole sample and
in the sample restricted to the donations of whole blood by male donors, average and median
lags immediately before the donation before the one leading to being granted a private reward
(7th to 8th, 15th to 16th, and 23rd to 24th) are quite similar to the overall values. In contrast,
the elapsed times for the donations leading to the public awards (49th to 50th, 74th to 75th,
and 99th to 100th) are sizably shorter: Average and median spells are 109 and 98 days for all
types of donations, and 138 and 119 for the donations of whole blood by male donors. Since
the minimum lag between two whole-blood donations is 90 days, the average reduction in the
"eﬀective" time elapsed between donations of whole blood is from 100 days (i.e., 190-90) to 48
(i.e., 138-90) — a 50% reduction.
Figure 3 shows the entire distributions (c.d.f.) of elapsed days between consecutive donations
for donations corresponding to no award, donations leading to a private award, and donations
leading to publicly recognized awards. In Figure 4 we repeat the same exercise while isolating
male whole-blood donors and reporting the distributions of "excess" intervals (i.e., elapsed days
minus the 90 days required by law). While the distributions of the no-award and the private-
award intervals do not appear to be too diﬀerent from one another, the distribution of the
public-award intervals is ostensibly shifted to the left.
[Table 3 about here]
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]
4.2 Awards’ Visibility and Donation Lags: Regression Analysis
Following the discussion in Section 3 above, our regression analyses will estimate various speci-
ﬁcations of the following empirical model:
Elapsi,n,m,t = α + β1AwardPrivate
i,n + β2AwardPublic
i,n + β3Zi,t + γt + μm + δi + εi,n,m,t. (1)
In Model (1), Elapsi,n,m,t is the elapsed time (in days) between individual i’s n − 1th and nth
donations, AwardPrivate
i,n is a dummy variable equal to 1 if donation n is the 8th, 16th, or 24th
donation and zero otherwise, AwardPublic
i,n is a dummy variable equal to 1 if donation n is the
50th, 75th, or 100th donation and 0 otherwise, Zi,t is a vector of (possibly individual-speciﬁca n d
time-varying) control variables, γt and μm are vectors of year and month dummies respectively,
and the error term is composed of an individual-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n tδi and a "white noise"
εi,n,m,t.
10Table 4 reports the results of four speciﬁcations.8 The main coeﬃcients of interest are β1 and,
especially, β2: they represent estimates of the changes in the donations lag in correspondence
of private and public rewards respectively, as compared to any other donation. Columns (1),
(2), and (3) report results from ordinary least squares regressions, and column (4) reports
the coeﬃcient estimates from ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions. In the ﬁrst column, the speciﬁcation
includes, as controls, sex, age categories, year ﬁxed eﬀects, month ﬁxed eﬀects, and an indicator
for whether a donation is of plasma or platelets. The coeﬃcient estimate on AwardPrivate is
negative but small and statistically insigniﬁcant, while that on AwardPublic is negative, quite
large in magnitude and strongly statistically signiﬁcant. In column (2) we include among the
controls the number of past donations made by an individual, as well as a vector of "cohort"
indicators, i.e., dummy variables for the year each donor joined the association. We do so in order
to control for heterogeneity across donors as well as for possible changes in donation patterns
o v e rt i m e .I nc o l u m n( 3 )w ea l s oinclude an indicator variable for donations above the 50th, to
further control for the possibility that the "public award" dummies are just capturing a selection
eﬀect, with more frequent donors being the ones letting shorter time pass between donations,
regardless of the presence of awards. In column (4), ﬁnally, we estimate the same model as in
column (3) with the addition of individual ﬁxed eﬀects. The OLS and ﬁxed-eﬀect regressions
yield qualitatively similar results; the estimates on the public award dummy are attenuated
(though still signiﬁcant), moving from -46 to -27 in the fully speciﬁed models (3) and (4). The
attenuation conﬁrms the importance of accounting for individual observed and unobservable
heterogeneity. Remarkably, the coeﬃcient on the "public" award variable is always substantially
(and signiﬁcantly) larger than that on the "private" award. In the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation,
the coeﬃcient on the "private" awards dummy is only marginally signiﬁcant, while that on the
"public" awards dummy remains sizable and strongly statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, these
results strongly conﬁrm the descriptive evidence presented above, with a sizable response of
donors to the opportunity to receive public recognition when such an opportunity is within close
reach.
[Table 4 about here]
8In the analyses reported here, the elapsed time between donations enters in levels. Regressions with the
natural logarithm of Elapsi,n,t as the dependent variable (performed so as to assess the relative impacts and to
make sure the results are not driven by outliers), not reported here, yield qualititively similar results in terms of
both the signs of coeﬃcients and their statistical signiﬁcance.
114.2.1 Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests
Below we report a series of additional analyses that further investigate the nature of the drop
in donation lags around the public award threshold, and to reinforce the identiﬁcation of the
impact of social image concerns on blood donation behavior.
First, we assess whether the change in donation lags occurs only in correspondence of the
single donations that entitles to the award or whether donors, instead, progressively reduce their
lag as they approach the symbolic-award thresholds. We also investigate whether donors build
a habit of more frequent donations, thus keeping lower lags in future donations right after they
reach an award threshold. Column (2) of Table 5 reports estimates from a regression similar
to that of Table 4, column (4) above, with the diﬀerence that dummies for the two donations
before, and the two donations after the donations giving right to the symbolic awards are added
among the controls. The result of this exercise indicates that the main eﬀect is focused on the
"critical" donation: Donors do not seem to form a habit, nor do they start reducing their lags
beforehand.
Second, we exploit a further institutional characteristic of the social incentive scheme devised
by AVIS in The Town, namely the fact that the biennial ceremony where the public awards are
given and the names of the awardees are revealed takes place every other year in the month of
February. In the period covered by our data, the ceremonies occurred in the month of February
of the years 2002, 2004, and 2006. If donors reduce their donation lags in proximity of the public
award thresholds because they care about social reputation, then one might see an additional
"speeding" when the public ceremony approaches. In Column (3) of Table 5, we run our fully
speciﬁed ﬁxed-eﬀect regression, adding interaction terms for whether the nth donation is at
a threshold, and it occurs on the month of the ceremony, one month earlier, two, three, or
four months earlier. Our results are suggestive of some "ceremony eﬀect," albeit limited to the
month when the ceremony is supposed to take place. Our results indicate that the lag between
donations is further reduced (from about -28 to about -61, and the diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level of conﬁdence) if the threshold donation falls in the month when
the ceremony is supposed to take place. Donors, therefore, appear to be more eager to make
the crucial donation as the ceremony approaches.
[Table 5 about here]
Third, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 we estimate a version of model (1) with a full
set of controls, ﬁxed eﬀects, and with dummies for each single threshold as opposed to just
distinguishing between the set of private and public awards. The sign of the estimated coeﬃcients
12is negative, with only the coeﬃcient on the dummy for the 50th donation being statistically
signiﬁcant. This is interesting, because the 50th donation threshold is the ﬁrst one to give
public recognition, and this can explain why donors seem to be particularly responsive to it.9
Finally, in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 we report the results of analyses limited to two
subsamples: all donations by male donors, and the donation of whole blood by male donors.
Focusing on whole blood donations by male donors, in particular, provides us with a more ho-
mogenous (and large enough) sample that allows us to analyze the magnitudes of the estimates.
In column (4), to further address potential selection issues not fully addressed by donor ﬁxed
eﬀects, we restrict the sample to only include male donors of whole blood who eventually will
reach at least 50 donations. Doing so reduces considerably the number of donors and obser-
vations, but it does not aﬀect the magnitude or the statistical signiﬁcance of our coeﬃcient of
interest. Once we fully control for observables and unobservable, time-invariant characteristics,
the reduction in the donation lags in proximity of the private rewards is not signiﬁcant (or only
marginally signiﬁcant), while the estimated reduction in the donation lag at the 50th award
threshold is statistically signiﬁcant, with a magnitude of 26 (column 3) to 28 (column 4) days.
Considering that the average whole-blood donation lag by male donors is 190 days and that the
minimum legal lag is 90, the estimated actual reduction in whole blood donation lags is about
30% — a substantial percentage.
[Table 6 about here]
All in all, these additional exercises reinforce the claim that donors respond to social image
concerns.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we have documented that the performance of pro-social activities is responsive to
the social prestige attached to these activities. Using longitudinal data from the whole popu-
lation of blood donors in an Italian town, we have found that donors accelerate their donation
frequency as their "tenure" gets closer to thresholds at which the blood donors’ Association
(AVIS) confers symbolic rewards to repeat donors, but this acceleration is concentrated right
before the quotas for which the rewards are publicly announced in the local community. The
reduction in the lag is substantial, and is not followed by an ebb in frequency after the thresh-
olds are reached. Social image concerns, therefore, may serve as a mechanism to increase blood
supply and to reduce the frequent cases of shortage.
9In addition, note from Table 1 that only a handful of donors make it to the 75th and 100th donations, therefore
regressions might just lack enough power to identify any response at higher thresholds.
13This paper oﬀers a contribution to the literature on the relationship between intrinsic and
extrinsic incentives in the performance of pro-social activities and the contribution to public
goods, by showing that extrinsic incentives without direct economic value also might increase
these activities, especially if social recognition is attached to these rewards. The contribution to
this literature is also methodological, since we add evidence from a natural setting to the current
evidence based on controlled lab and ﬁeld experiments, and the longitudinal nature of the data
allows controlling for individual heterogeneity. Our study also contributes to a recent empirical
literature on the behavioral eﬀects of awards in general. As pointed out by Neckermann and
Frey (2007), awards are broadly used in a variety of contexts, but have not been investigated by
economists in depth. We document that, at least in the case of pro-social behavior, an important
component of these awards is their publicity, so that awardees can boost their social image.
A major implication of our ﬁndings is for charitable organizations: In their decisions on how
to incentivize and reward their contributors, these organizations should consider the positive
response to public recognition as a potentially strong (and cost-eﬀective) motivator. If the
social-image component of symbolic rewards is a driver of altruistic activities, however, a "too
high" number of these rewards, e.g., in terms of how often they are given to contributors and
to how many contributors they are given, might dilute the social prestige attached to being
publicly known as a frequent donor. The so-called "snob eﬀect" that a number of studies have
analyzed on the demand side for certain products (Leibenstein 1950, Pesendorfer 1995) might
be present on the supply side also, especially for activities carrying a social-image impact. A
challenge for charities is, therefore, to devise the optimal structure, in terms of quantity and
frequency, of public rewards for their contributors.
A further implication is for public policies aimed at stimulating the voluntary contributions
of citizens to public goods. If individuals have private motives to contribute to public goods
beyond "pure altruism" (Andreoni [1989, 1990]), then public contributions should not result in
a net crowd out of private contributions.10 The quest for social prestige that we found as having
as i g n i ﬁcant impact on pro-social behavior is one of these private motives, therefore public in-
terventions such as matching private contributions of subsidizing charitable organizations might
indeed increase the provision of these public goods.
10On the possibility of "private" motivations for giving, see Andreoni (1989, 1990, 1993), Vesterlund (2006),
and Andreoni et al. (2007).
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N percent N percent N percent
"Merit Certificate" 8 394 2.75 286 2.56 121 2.48
"Bronze Medal" 16 290 2.02 213 1.91 105 2.15
"Silver Medal" 24 207 1.44 160 1.43 79 1.62
Total "private" awards 891 6.21 659 5.9 305 6.25
"Golden Medal" 50 67 0.47 61 0.55 24 0.49
"Golden Pin" 75 38 0.26 35 0.31 11 0.23
"Golden Cross" 100 21 0.15 21 0.19 9 0.18
Total "public" awards 126 0.88 117 1.05 44 0.9
Total awards 1,017 7.12 763 6.98 763 6.98
Total donations (2002-2006) 14,351 100 11,165 100 10,926 100
Unique donors (2002-2006) 2,009 1,425 856
All donors Males Males, 
Whole blood only
Table 1: Awards, donation thresholds to achieve them, and their frequency in the data, 2002-
2006. The category "Males, Whole blood only" includes only male donors who always donate
whole blood.
18Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max Obs
Fraction female 0.29 2,009
A g e 3 7 . 4 5 1 0 . 8 4 1 83 76 5 2 , 0 0 9
Years in the sample 3.20 1.54 1 3 5 2,009
Donations in the period 2002-06:
   All donors 7.14 6.01 1 6 47 2,009
   Males 7.84 6.38 1 6 47 1,425
   Females 5.46 4.60 1 4 31 584
Average number of donations per year
   All donors 2.23 1.40 1 2 12 6,422
   Males 2.33 1.44 1 2 12 4,783
   Females 1.94 1.22 1 2 9 1,639
Information as of 12/31/01:
Years active (all donors) 5.13 7.29 0 2 38 1,937
Past donations (all donors) 13.29 20.92 0 4 145 2,009
Years active (donors active as of 12/31/01) 9.07 7.63 1 7 38 1095
Past donations (donors active as of 12/31/01) 22.17 23.46 0 14 145 1,167
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max Obs
Fraction female 0.22 14,351
Fraction plasma/platelets 0.33 14,351
Age of donor 40.3 10.6 18 40 65 14,220
Days between consecutive donations 157.9 141.8 4 119 1,749 12,342
Donors
Donations
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics. Sample period: 2002-2006.




Mean 157.9 164.6 109.5
Median 119 129 98
St.Dev. 142.9 131.7 76.2
N. Obs. 11,428 796 118




Mean 151.4 158.5 103.5
Median 116 126 98
St.Dev. 134.2 126.0 71.5
N. Obs. 9,036 595 109




Mean 100.3 105.8 48.1
Median 51 58 29
St.Dev. 152.2 146.2 70.2
N. Obs. 3,724 265 39
Males, Whole blood only, Adjusted (*)
Whole Sample
Males
Table 3: Elapsed days between consecutive donations, 2002-2006. The table reports statistics
on the number of days between consecutive donations (n-1 and n) for the cases where donation
n does not correspond to any medal ("no award"), donation n corresponds to privately awarded
medals ("private" awards), and donation n corresponds to publicly awarded medals ("public"
awards). (*) For the subsample of males who only donate whole blood, we report statistics on
the "excess" interval, i.e., the days between consecutive donations minus 90, where 90 is the
minimum required number of days between donations.
20Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private award 
(1) -3.041 -15.61*** -15.82*** -9.780*
(5.911) (5.766) (5.753) (5.044)
Public award 
(2) -42.89*** -26.02*** -46.33*** -26.60***
(9.215) (9.256) (10.060) (8.039)
Female 49.41*** 32.78*** 32.65***
(5.197) (4.908) (4.786)
Age 30-39 -1.795 -8.193 -6.689 -15.00*
(5.823) (5.342) (5.221) (8.491)
Age 40-49 -15.56*** -8.826 -8.378 -15.07
(5.845) (5.568) (5.458) (12.240)
Age 50 + -26.51*** -16.25** -15.70** -24.84*
(5.999) (6.490) (6.347) (14.970)
Plasma/platelets
(3) -79.29*** -59.65*** -58.56*** -36.60***
(3.377) (3.128) (3.110) (2.928)
Number of past donations -2.508*** -3.144*** -10.23***
(0.235) (0.297) (1.050)
Donation>50
 (4) 52.36*** 18.75**
(8.781) (9.059)
Constant 126.3*** 559.4*** 585.8*** 321.1***
(6.213) (29.970) (32.850) (22.830)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects No Yes Yes -
Individual Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Observations 12,289 12,287 12,287 12,287
R-squared 0.11 0.18 0.19 0.10
Number of donors (FE) 1,725
Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent variable: days between consecutive donations
Table 4: Award and Frequency of Donation: Regression Results. The dependent variable is
the number of days between consecutive donations. Standard errors (in parentheses) are in all
cases clustered by individual donor. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) Private Award is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the corresponding donation is the 8th, 16th, or the 24th (i.e.,
donations associated with a privately awarded prize). (2) Public Award is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the corresponding donation is the 50th, 75th, or the 100th (i.e., donations associated
with a publicly awarded prize). (3) Plasma/platelets is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a given
donation is of plasma or platelets and 0 if it is of whole blood. (4) Donation>50 is an indicator
variable equal to 1 for donations from the 50th up.
21(1) (2) (3)
2 donations before Private award 8.009
(5.780)
1 donation before Private award 0.704
(5.790)
Private award 
(1) -9.780* -8.883* -9.827*
(5.044) (5.320) (5.060)
1 donation after Private award 6.064
(6.560)
2 donations after Private award -5.6
(5.330)
2 donations before Public award -16.61*
(9.650)
1 donation before Public award 2.445
(10.600)
Public award 
(2) -26.60*** -27.89*** -27.70***
(8.039) (8.500) (9.090)
1 donation after Public award 6.339
(12.100)
2 donations after Public award -13.85
(10.100)
Public award*(month of ceremony) -33.19**
(15.600)
Public award*(1 month before ceremony) 21.2
(13.000)
Public award*(2 months before ceremony) -24.44
(27.300)
Public award*(3 months before ceremony) 18.36
(29.500)
Public award*(4 months before ceremony) 22.73
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,287 12,287 12,287
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10
Number of donors (FE) 1,725 1,725 1,725
All donors, Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: days between consecutive donations
Table 5: Award and Frequency of Donation: Distance to Ceremony and Leads and Lags. The
dependent variable is the number of days between consecutive donations. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are in all cases clustered by individual donor. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) Private Award is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the corresponding donation is the 8th,
16th ,or the 24th (i.e., donations associated with a privately awarded prize). (2) Public Award
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the corresponding donation is the 50th, 75th, or the 100th
(i.e., donations associated with a publicly awarded prize). Controls include year eﬀects, month
eﬀects, an indicator for whether the donation was of blood components (plasma or platelets),
age dummies (18-29, 30-39, 40-40, 50+), the number of past donations, and an indicator for
donations above the 50th.






(1) (2) (3) (4)
8th donation award -9.931* -13.29* -18.2
(5.906) (6.839) (14.590)
16th donation award -2.474 -1.225 0.912
(7.810) (8.527) (14.980)
24th donation award -4.235 -5.228 -6.328
(6.206) (6.329) (8.270)
50th donation award -20.84** -21.70** -26.11** -28.28**
(10.60) (9.74) (13.25) (13.04)
75th donation award -4.701 -3.612 13.48 8.795
(9.989) (9.804) (22.340) (23.430)
100th donation award -0.65 -2.518 4.207 0.238
(12.320) (10.920) (13.000) (11.380)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,287 9,719 4,015 872
R-squared 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.09
Number of donors (FE) 1,725 1,237 682 95
Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: days between consecutive donations
Table 6: Award and Frequency of Donation: Robustness Checks. The dependent variable is
the number of days between consecutive donations. Standard errors (in parentheses) are in all
cases clustered by individual donor. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include year
eﬀects, month eﬀects, an indicator for whether the donation was of blood components (plasma
or platelets), age dummies (18-29, 30-39, 40-40, 50+), the number of past donations, and an
indicator for donations above the 50th.
23BF i g u r e s
Figure 1: Article from a local newspaper in The Town reporting the names of all donors awarded for
reaching 50, 75, and 100 donations, in occasion of the biannual ceremony of the local AVIS Chapter. The
name of the town and of the rewarded donors have been redacted for conﬁdentiality reasons.
Figure 2: Sample AVIS membership card. The donor’s personal information and any possible identifying
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Figure 3: Distribution of elapsed times (days) between consecutive donations (donations leading
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Figure 4: Distribution of elapsed times (days) between consecutive whole blood donations in
excess of 90 (the minimum interval required by law for male whole blood donors). Male whole
blood donors only.
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